OMEN IN Western societies are apt to identify the question of women's liberation with the "right to work." The discussion of the rights of women often involves heated controversy over how it is possible for women to "go out to work" and still "take care of the home" and "be mothers." The home-work dichotomy splits male and female on opposite sides of the economic system, locating men on the side of production, women as managers of the consumer support system. When women gain the right to enter a profession, it is still very hard for them to compete with men on an equal footing, since they are also presumed to be in charge of this domestic support system. Even the childless or unmarried woman is handicapped in relation to a married male on the job who has a wife who cleans his house, cooks, shops, and plans the household, thus freeing the man for full-time attention to the "job." In this system woman's work remains invisible and unpaid. It is this double bind that is the primary reason why so few women have been able to take advantage of work opportunities even when, theoretically, they are open to them in industrial societies.
fields, and make weapons. The grown men are freed by the work of women and youth in order to "palaver," to engage in the political and social discourse of village government. Women are the productive laborers of society. 1 Here there is no split between home and work, because the economy still has its original locus in the home.
WOMEN AND WORK IN PREINDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES
The picture of women in many preindustrial societies is found in Proverbs 31:10-31:
She seeks wool and flax and works with willing hands. . . . She rises while it is yet night and provides food for her household and tasks for her maidens. She considers a field and buys it, with the fruit of her hands she plants a vineyard. . . . She perceives that her merchandise is profitable; Her lamp does not go out at night; She puts her hands to the distaff and her hands hold the spindle. . . . Her husband is known in the gates when he sits among the elders of the land. She makes linen garments and sells them; She delivers girdles to the merchant. . . .
In this picture we see women as the primary workers and managers of the economic realm, freeing men for the roles of political discourse "at the gates." This role did not disappear with the urban revolution, although women and men's roles became less equalitarian than they had been in village life and sharp class divisions appeared. Not only did women continue to be workers in peasant life, but the latifunda of the great landed families were often largely managed by the wife as an extension of a family-centered economy, while the men occupied themselves with war and politics. This was to a large extent true even of the plantations of the American South. Lacking an industrial base, plantations managed by the wives supported the economy that was squandered by their husbands in the Civil War.
2 As long as the economy was centered on the family, women had an important economic role and even an economic bargaining power in society, despite the patriarchal character of the political system that might define women as dependent and rightless.
The transition from rural to urban life was an important turning point in the history of women. The urban revolution originally affected only a small segment of society, however, while the rest of society remained agrarian and in a family-centered handicraft economy. But the urban revolution created a new elite group of males whose power was no longer based on the personal prowess of the hunter or warrior, but on an inherited monopoly of political power, land, and knowledge. The political sphere, which had already fallen into the hands of males in village society by and large, could now be monopolized by this elite to define women and lower classes in a dependent and inferior relation to themselves. Generally we find women excluded not only from political leadership (although they may be place holders for male heirs) but from those professional roles in culture and religion that buttress political power. Scribes and priests exclude women programmatically, although no biological differences would have prevented women from entering these fields on equal terms. It is from these classes that we also get those religious laws and ideologies that codify the doctrines of female inferiority in classical societies.
Yet various professions often remained in women's hands in classical societies which they were subsequently to lose. In general, we may say that roles remain open to women as long as they are based more on experience and folk knowledge. Once the training necessary to enter them becomes professionalized, women are excluded. The exclusion of women from education in classical societies becomes the chief means of excluding women from the entire process of the reflection upon and transmission of culture, as well as access to the training necessary for all the valued professional roles.
Medicine was often monopolized by women in earlier societies. Pharmacy was an extension of their role as cooks and gatherers of herbs. As mothers, they were also midwives and healers of injuries and diseases. Certain "wise women" often specialized in these healing arts in villages. As medicine became professionalized, sometimes a few women were allowed to participate in the early stages. There were women in the schools of medicine in Spain in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in medieval Europe, for example. But generally professionalization meant both the exclusion of women from the necessary training for the profession and a gradual proscription of their earlier exercise of it based on folk knowledge.
3 This is particularly true when scribal and priestly exclusions of women join together. Such an exclusion of women from the study of medicine is represented by the decree issued by the faculty of the University of Bologna in 1377 A.D.:
And whereas woman is the fountain of sin, the weapon of the Devil, the cause of man's banishment from Paradise and the ruin of the old laws, and whereas for these reasons all intercourse with her is to be diligently avoided; therefore we do interdict and expressly forbid that any one presume to introduce into the said college any woman, whatsoever, however honorable she be. If this nonwithstanding anyone should perpetrate such an act, he shall be severely punished by the Rector. 4 The effect of such exclusion of women is sometimes a dual system. There is the trained doctor for the upper classes and the folk "wise woman" for the poor. The result in the Middle Ages was not always an improvement of medicine, because university medical training was highly theoretical, based on classical authorities without experimental verification, while the medicine of the "wise woman" was based on experience and practice. But there was also magic mixed up with it. The great persecution of old women as witches in the Late Middle Ages down to the eighteenth century had, as one aspect, the crushing of the wise woman as folk doctor and pharmacist. Soon after, the professionally trained doctor also displaces the woman as midwife as well. 5 This new male hegemony in obstetrics had the side effect of an outsider's approach to the woman in delivery as a "patient" who is ill, whose body is treated as an object, rather than as an active participant in a natural process.
In Europe in the seventeenth century women's traditional role in crafts meant that some guilds, especially those associated with weaving and clothmaking, were female. Women also were trained in many crafts as assistants to their husbands. The proximity of shops and homes and the family aspect of guild membership meant that a widow often continued her husband's craft. In the seventeenth century there was a concerted elimination of women in crafts through professionalization and new forms of organization and through licensing that specifically forbade woman's participation. For example, women traditionally had been brewers, but new laws forbade the granting of licensing for brewing to women. The tradition of women in skilled crafts, as entrepreneurs and owners of taverns and businesses, continued longer in colonial America, where the frontier situation made the working woman still valuable. The elimination of women in business and crafts that affected Europe in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries only became general in America at the end of the eighteenth century. 
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE "CULT OF TRUE WOMANHOOD"
Industrialization is a second critical turning point in the socioeconomic history of women. On the one hand, it added a new economic dependence of men to the legal dependence that had been imposed on women in classical patriarchy. This had already been the case of upper-class women, but working-class women could still be self-supporting as long as the economy was family-centered. Industrialization progressively removed all self-supporting functions from the home, refashioning the family as a sphere totally dependent on an economic system outside of it. Women's role was also refashioned from that of an active laborer in vital economic processes to that of a manager of consumption and an ornament to her husband's economic prowess.
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But industrialization also created new frustrations and contradictions for a larger mass of women, increasingly deprived of active participation in the life of society. This frustration made feminism a mass mpvement, rather than treatises written by a few educated women of the upper classes. Industrialization also forced many poor women out of the home into doubly oppressive conditions of the factories. The liberal doctrines of equal rights began to be taken up by women and by workers who had not been included in those declarations of the "rights of man" declared by the victorious bourgeois of the French and the American Revolutions. The efforts to press woman into her newly limited and intensified role in the home created new ideologies of women's "natural" difference from men. But the revolt against this stifling sphere also began the systematic challenging of the classical patriarchal status of women as property and political dependents on men.
Industrialization completed the reshaping of the role of the home and the ideologies of womanhood and childhood that had begun under bourgeois commercial society. The home is privatized as an intensive center of personal life and nurture. The retainers, servants, and other dependents that have lived with their masters, even in relatively modest households, are gradually thrust out and the nuclear family withdraws into itself. Many family functions, such as childbirth, that have been public occasions, withdraw into secrecy. The home loses its more open, public character. Bedrooms cease to be areas of public socializing, although the great halls of the aristocracy keep these traditions longer. As the family withdraws into intensified private life, the concept of childhood is reshaped into an increasingly extended period of nurture and shaping of a malleable being. Women's role, in turn, is defined by this intensified domesticity and increasingly prolonged concept of childhood dependency. 8 The ideology of "true womanhood" or the "lady" shaped and reflected this intensified domestication of the middle-class woman. The cult of the lady and the idealized Home also played a crucial compensatory role in the new industrial society that was being formed. Although built on the earlier aristocratic traditions of courtly love, it was popularized in the nineteenth century as part of the middle-class reaction against secularization, social revolution, and industrial society, with their threats to traditional values. The Home and Womanhood were to be everything that the modern industrial society was not. Here in the home patriarchy and the natural aristocracy of "birth" still held sway in male-female relations, although democratic concepts were everywhere else challenging this concept. Here the religious world view of fixed certainties could be maintained in an age of growing unbelief. Here emotionality and intimacy held sway in a world dominated outside by unfeeling technological rationality. Here sublimated spirituality compensated for the outward capitulation to the fierce materialism of industrial competition.
Here an Eden of beauty and peace walled the bourgeois at home off from the ugly work world of the factories. The home was, above all, the realm of nostalgic religiosity, to be cultivated by women, to which men could repair to escape the threatening outside world of doubt, insecurity, and social restiveness. Women were to remain precriticai and insulated against this threatening world, in order to preside over a home where men could preserve their faith in those values in which they no longer believed but wanted to believe that they still believed. The almost religious veneration of the home and womanhood in Victorian society must be seen in this context of escape and compensation for the threats to all these traditional values posed by the industrial revolution. 9 This idealization of woman in the home as effectively removed her from the "real world" of men and public affairs as had her earlier denigiation as that "devil's gateway, font of sin, and unsealer of the forbidden fruit." It is said that women are "too pure," too noble, to descend into the base world of work and politics. To step out of her moral shrine to work or to vote, to attend universities with men, and mingle with them in the forums of power is to sully her virtue and destroy instantly that respect which accrues to her in the "sanctuary" of the home. This "down from the pedestal" argument became the chief tool by which social conservatives in the Church and society rebutted every effort of the rising women's movement to enlarge the public sphere of women. Much the same arguments are used today against the Equal Rights Amendment.
These arguments reveal the fundamental ambiguity of the male ideology of "femininity." These characteristics are seen simultaneously as unchangeably rooted in woman's biological "nature," and yet as something that can be lost instantly as soon as she steps out of her assigned social role. In the early twentieth century the Catholic bishops of the United States put themselves solidly on record against women's suffrage. An interview with Cardinal Gibbons reveals the line of the argument: "Women's suffrage," questioned the Cardinal. ... "I am surprised that one should ask the question. I have but one answer to such a question, and that is that I am unalterably opposed to woman's suffrage, always have been and always will be. . . . Why should a woman lower herself to sordid politics? Why should a woman leave her home and go into the streets to play the game of politics? Why should she long to come into contact with men at the polling places? Why should she long to rub elbows with men who are her inferiors intellectually and morally? Why should a woman long to go into the streets and leave behind her happy home, her children, a husband and everything that goes to make up an ideal domestic life? . . . When a woman enters the political arena, she goes outside the sphere for which she was intended. She gains nothing by that journey. On the other hand, she loses the exclusiveness, respect and dignity to which she is entitled in her home.
"Who wants to see a woman standing around the polling places; speaking to a crowd on the street corner; pleading with those in attendance at a political meeting? Certainly such a sight would not be relished by her husband or by her children. Must the child, returning from school, go to the polls to find his mother? Must the husband, returning from work, go to the polls to find his wife, soliciting votes from this man and that. . . ? Woman is queen," said the Cardinal, in bringing the interview to a close, "but her kingdom is the domestic kingdom."
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This split between woman's sphere in the home and the male world of work created a new ideological dualism which divided the feminine from the masculine, the private self from the public world, morality from facts. Religion, driven into the private realm by secularization, also participated in and was shaped by this split. This split partially reversed the older typologies of female "nature." Whereas classical Christianity unhesitatingly saw women as less religious, spiritual, and moral than men, nineteenth-century culture typically saw women as inherently more moral, spiritual, and religious than men. Whereas earlier culture had regarded women as more sexual than men, almost insatiably so, Victorian womanhood was regarded as almost asexual. The "true woman" is almost incapable of feeling sexuality, and sexual desire is banished from her mind. Carnality is ceded to the male nature, as part of his rough dealings with the "real world" of materialism and power. Religion likewise recedes into the "feminine" world of spirituality divorced from truth or power. The material world is now seen as the "real world," the world of hard, practical aggressivity, devoid of sentiment or morality.
Rationality is still located in the man and "his world," but it loses the quality of wisdom and becomes that functional rationality that is the tool for manipulating matter through science. Reason is split from morality, making reason "value-free" and morality sentimentalized. Religion especially falls victim to this sentimentalization of spirituality and morality. Morality and religion fall into the realm of "private man," in the home, de facto the realm of women. The ethical split between "moral man" (private man) and "immoral society" (public man) unconsciously is split along the lines of work and home, masculine and feminine. Christian virtue, agape, comes to be seen as peculiarly "feminine." Christ too in nineteenth-century religion comes to be seen typically as a "feminine" figure, no longer the Christ Pantocrator of Christendom. The Church and the clergy function, like women, to create a nostalgic place of escape and compensation for an evil public world. But this realm of Church, home, and women also is the tacit support of the secular realm of male power, by pacifying the private self in relation to it. Christian virtue is both politically conservative and yet apolitical. It is "feminine" in a way that makes it also "unrealistic" and "out of place" in the world of "manly men."
The Victorian cult of true womanhood was a class myth. Industry, together with a still existing servant class, made possible a new group of leisured middle-class women who displayed through their delicacy, elegance, and idleness the wealth of the new economic leaders.
11 But the myth of the lady also ignored the large numbers of working women driven into the factories to work long hours at pitiable wages. Its sublimated leisure culture of affluence was built on sexual and social oppression.
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The asexual "purity" of the "good woman" had its underside in the proliferation of houses of prostitution.
13 Its affluence was built on the exploitation of factory labor. These two forms of oppression mingled in the poor woman, who, often unable to survive on her low factory wages, turned to prostitution. Work itself was seen as a kind of "fall" from purity, destroying that "femininity" and "purity" of the lady. Thus the class division between the lady and the working woman also fissured into the dual ideologies of the pure asexual feminine and evil carnal femaleness. Since the cult of true womanhood made the leisured woman normative, woman going to work could only be viewed as a downfall from the sanctity of home. Nineteenth-century working women also developed their own political struggle and articulated their own needs, which differed radically from middle-class feminism. The vote, education, and professions were the class privileges of the sisters of those in power that did not speak to the condition of working women. Middle-class feminism often spurned working women or reached out to them only in the patronizing form of moral uplift for the fallen. Working women organized around their economic needs, better wages, and working conditions. But they generally found little help from their working brothers in the union movement. Women's work was either not taken seriously as real economic need or else the low wages of women were regarded as a threat to male wages. It was assumed that women work for "luxuries," not real support, despite the numbers of households headed by women. They are regarded as unreliable workers whose biology makes them irregular and who can be expected to stay on the job only until they get married. Doubtless the bad conditions often made these assumptions self-fulfilling prophecies.
Male unionists have seldom fought for equal pay for equal work for women, but instead have either ignored them or sought to segregate them in special types of low-paid work which did not threaten their own wages.
14 Fundamentally, women's work comes to be structured into job-support systems, such as stenography, which aid male work, or are used as a surplus labor force to be hired in times of added need, such as wartime, and fired when this need recedes. Despite the numbers of women in the work force today (about 40%), neither the ideology of womanhood nor the planned relations of home and work have been willing to adjust to this reality. Women at work still have to find ad hoc solutions for childcare, housekeeping help, performance of domestic work for themselves and their husband and children. "Women's work" in the home is still presumed to be theirs in a work world that makes no effort to adjust to the special reality of women. The world of work still organizes (New York, 1972) chaps. 9, 14, and 18. itself as though workers were male and have nonworking wives providing for their domestic needs.
THE SOCIALIST CRITIQUE OF WOMEN'S ROLE
The Utopian socialists of the early nineteenth century recognized that their critique of the family and private property involved a criticism of the role of women. Both sexual liberation and equal work roles for women were part of the program of the St. Simonians, Owenites, and Fourierites. Marx and Engels extended and deepened this connection between socialism and the liberation of women. Their experience with working women in English factories alerted them to the class character of the standard myth of the delicate lady, incapable of hard labor. There they saw women working ten and twelve hours a day under brutal conditions, only to return home to care for their domestic chores as well. But they also concluded that industralization, despite its doubly brutal conditions for women, was creating the economic basis for the emancipation of women. Marx and Engels and subsequent Marxists have hinged their concept of women's emancipation upon the restoration of women to the world of production. Only when women have autonomous incomes from their own labor will they have the economic basis for personal equality with men. As long as women are economic dependents on men, marriage is a degrading exchange of sexual rights and domestic labor for economic support. However softened by custom, its reality remains that of a kind of slavery and economic bondage. Autonomous work and independent income are the bases for all other rights and dignities of women. Without it, all rights and dignities are extended to her on the sufferance of males, who still retain the title to them in their own hands. In the Origin and History of the Family, Private Property and the State, 15 Engels worked out their view of the relation between the subjugation of women to the rise of private property and women's deprivation of an autonomous role in production. This they saw beginning to be restored by industrialism, as far as the working-class woman was concerned.
Engels believed that communism would establish complete equality between men and women by integrating women into all spheres of work equally with men. Women would receive the same education and could enter any occupation. The economic independence gained from work would be the foundation of their personal independence. They would no longer have to sell their sexuality for economic security or have their income and property owned and managed by their husbands, be coerced into marriage, or kept in marriages grown cold, by economic need. Marriage could return to being what Engels believed it had been 15 Originally published in Zurich, 1884.
originally, before the rise of the patriarchal system: a free personal relationship between two persons based on mutual compatibility, entered into and dissolved without economic coercion. Engels believed this would lead to stable monogamous relationships, which corresponded to the "natural love instincts" of humanity, which had been distorted by the economic power of one partner and the subordination of the other into hypocrisy and infidelity.
Contrary to Marx's expectations, communist revolutions did not take place in advanced industrial countries but in countries engaged in overthrowing feudal and colonial regimes and just beginning to enter the industrial revolution. Women in prerevolutionary Russia or China had not yet experienced the expanded work roles or the enlarged education and civil rights of Western industrialism and liberalism. Their status was still that of chattel of fathers and husbands, who could be married, sold, and even killed at will.
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Communist revolutions have made good on the Marxist belief in the union between female emancipation and proletarian revolution by sweeping transformations of the status of women. Marriage codes established the complete civil equality of women, and comprehensive childcare and even communal kitchens, maternity leave and guaranteed re-employment, and campaigns to transform cultural consciousness strove to open the world of work to women on an equal basis. In China this policy of female emancipation demanded a literal uprooting and re-creating of the Chinese family.
17 Article 6 of the Constitution, adopted in September 1946, declared: "The People's Republic of China abolishes the feudal system which holds women in bondage. Women shall enjoy equal rights with men in political, economic, cultural, educational, and social life. Freedom of marriage for men and women shall be enforced."
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All forms of concubinage and forced marriage were abolished, and divorce was to be granted by mutual consent. But the communalization of work conditions and the home, carried out much more radically in China than in Russia, has been the social basis for equality of women on the job and in their personal relations. The private work of women in the home has become communal work, freeing women on the job from the handicap of the double shift of home and work.
Women in the West can recognize the more systematic integration of women into work in Marxist countries. Communist regimes have been willing to recognize what liberal industrialism has always avoided, namely, that women cannot be equal on the job until there is a social reorganization of the economic relations of home and work and the unpaid roles of the home are no longer placed solely on the backs of women. As long as working women must solve this problem on an individual basis, paying out of their meager salaries for substitute homeworkers, only a small elite, often unmarried or childless, can hope for significant careers, while those who must work as heads of households are forced into desperate contradictions which often leave the vital roles of the home neglected. Women are made to feel guilty for this failure, instead of society taking responsibility for adjusting the relationship of work and home in just and rational ways.
However, women may well ask whether the social values created by the Marxist solution are a sufficient answer to the historic dependency of women. This is not only because women, especially in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, are often left with considerable residue of the unpaid second shift of the home, handicapped thereby on the job and still subject to sexual stereotyping of work. Even more, one might ask whether the Marxist solution does not make a male concept of alienated work the exclusive pattern for life and values. The Marxist solution envisions the integration of women into this type of alienated labor by drastically reducing the work of the home, collectivizing it in the public sector.
But what is called the "home" is nothing less than the original base of personal autonomy in the self-governing familial community, which has greatly shrunk in its economic, political, and cultural functions due to the alienation of these functions into public patterns of socialization. Marxism proposes to emancipate women by totalizing this process of alienation and collectivization, leaving the home little more than a bedroom and a nucleus of fleeting personal relations. As one function after another is collectivized outside the family, the family progressively loses its self-determination and becomes totally determined by social forces over which it has no power. The shrinking of the home, then, becomes the means of creating the totalitarian society where the self has lost its autonomous base. Socialists, as well as feminists, must rethink the social role of the home, if they are committed to a society of freedom as well as a society of equal work roles.
Socialism is based on a concept of women's rights that unquestionably assumes that this process is one of obliteration of the female sphere into the masculine sphere, that is to say, the alienation of local self-determination into macro-collectivization. The values cultivated in the home, the values identified with women, are thereby also obliterated for an exclusive definition of society through the values of conflict, work, and repression. Communism totalizes the society of alienated work and warfare, instead of, as Marx himself envisioned, abolishing this society. One must ask whether a society which seeks both freedom and equal work roles, both justice and humanization, must not envision the process of socialization the other way around, not by completing the historic process of alienating the functions of the home, but by resocializing the home by bringing access to work and political decision-making back into a more integral relationship to it. Communalization of home and work that puts the ownership and decision-making over these spheres in the hands of the local community represents a kind of socialization which restores rather than destroys the sphere of self-determination. The communal patterns of China, as the base for constructing the larger networks of society, or the kibbutz patterns embedded within the larger social system in Israel, are possible models for this development. Women are reintegrated into the larger world of work and decision-making, and society takes responsibility of communal childraising, not so much by abolishing the family and the home as by re-embedding it in a "tribe," or a network of relationships whose concrete functionings can be governed by the local group itself. Working and living complexes must still be integrated into larger structures of planning and exchange, but this does not mitigate against the possibility of a system where local communities make the concrete decisions that shape their own lives.
The bringing of work back to relationship to the base of autonomous community life also suggests the shaping of society by different values than those of alienated work and conflict, which have been, historically, shaped by the male roles. A humanized society must be one reintegrated into those values cultivated in the female sphere: co-operation, mutual support, leisure, celebration, free creativity, and exploration of feelings and personal relations. The priorities of human life must be re-examined. Work itself must be seen as a means to the end of self-expression, mutual help, and fulfillment of being, rather than all existence shaped by a program of alienated labor. We do not exist in order to work, but we work in order to be-not merely in the sense of minimal survival, but in the sense of that fulfillment of being when work is reunified with creative self-expression and takes place in the framework of a community of mutual affirmation. It is this vision of the recovery of the world of work for women, which is at the same time the dealienation of work and the rediscovery of community, that must be the distinctive value which women should bring to the question of work.
